كامب ديفيد والسيادة المجروحة فى سيناء ، الوثائق والأرقام و الحقائق

[يحى الشاعر]

مما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها - 1

يتسم موضوع إتفاقية كامب دافيد ، بالعديد من التعليلات والتأويلات ... وما زال هناك الكثير ، لمعرفة خبايا هذه الأتفاقية

وتنشر عدة مواقع عربية "إتفاقية كامب ديفيد بالتفصيل ، وينشرون معها الخرائط" وذلك فى مساق حرب العبور 1973 وإتفاقية

السلام بين مصر وإسرائيل ، النى وقعها الرئيس الراحل أنور السادات ومناحيم بيجين رئيس الوزراء الأسرائيلى فى حديقة

البيت الأبيض فى واشنطن

تكملة ، لنشاطنا في توثيق تاريخ مصر القومي بما في ذلك التاريخ "العسكري المصري"

فيما يلي نسخ الموضوع الضخم ، وقد نم تقسيمه إلي عدة أجزاء .. كما قمت بإعداد وتنسيق لما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها ، ومما يضيف الأهمية للباحث ، هو جميع "الوثائق الأصلية PDF بي دي إف" بما في ذلك التي تم كتابتهم بخط اليد، لذلك

أقترح علي القاريء ، أن يدخل أيضا : للمصادر الرئيسية ، التي أكرر نسخ روابطهم

وسأواصل تكملته إن شاء الله ، حتي يكون موضوعا واحدا ومرجعا للباحثين عن معرفة الكثير

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د. يحى الشاعر

- 1 -

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ....

كان الرئيس الأمريكى جيمى كارتر والصحافة العالمية ومحطات التلفزيزن شاهدون لحفلة التوقيع ...، نلاحظ العسل بين سطور النص فى البداية التي تتطور وتنتهي إلي السم فيما بعد ....

فهذا نص اتفاقية كامب ديفد التى فقدت مصر بها شرفها بعقد اتفاق رسمى

منقول ...."

وكانت مصر واسرائيل قد وقعتا اتفاقية سلام عام1978 بعد حرب اكتوبر المجيدة و هذا نص الاتفاقيه:

ان حكومة جمهورية مصر العربية وحكومة دولة اسرائيل اقتناعا منهما بالضرورة الماسة لاقامة سلام عادل وشامل ودائم فى الشرق الاوسط وفقا لقرارى مجلس الامن رقم 242 و 338 اذ تؤكدان من جديد التزامهما باطار السلام فى الشرق الاوسط المتفق عليه فى كامب ديفيد فى سبتمبر 1978

واذ تلاحظان ان الاطار المشار إليه انما قصد به ان يكون اساسا للسلام ليس بين مصر واسرائيل فحسب بل ايضا بين اسرائيل واى من جيرانها العرب كل فيما يخصه ممن يكون على استعداد للتفاوض من اجل السلام معها على هذا الاساس

ورغبة منها فى انهاء الحرب بينها واقامة سلام تستطيع فيه كل دولة فى المنطقة ان تعيش فى امن

واقتناعا منها بأن عقد معاهدة سلام بين مصر واسرائيل يعتبر خطوة هامة فى طريق السلام الشامل فى المنطقة والتوصل إلى تسوية النزاع العربى الاسرائيلى بكافة نواحيه، واذ تدعوان الاطراف العربية الااخرى فى النزاع الى الاشتراك فى عملية السلام مع اسرائيل على اساس مبادئ اطار الاسلام المشار اليها آنفا واسترشادا بها

واذ ترغبان أيضا فى انماء العلاقات الودية التعاون بينهما وفقا لميثاق الامم المتحدة ومبادئ القانون الدولى التى تحكم العلاقات الدولية فى زمن السلم

قد اتفقنا على الأحكام التالية بمقتضى ممارستها الحرة لسيادتهما من أجل تنفيذ الاطار على الاحكام التالية بمقتضى ممارستها الحرة لسيادتها من اجل تنفيذ الاطار الخاص بعقد معاهدة السلام بين مصر واسرائيل

المادة الاولى

1. تنتهى حالة الحرب بين الطرفين ويقام بينهما السلام عند تبادل وثائق التصديق على هذه المعاهدة 0

2. تسحب اسرائيل كافة قواتها المسلحة والمدنية من سيناء إلى ما وراء الحدود الدولية بين مصر وفلسطين تحت الانتداب كما هو وارد بالبرتوكول الملحق بهذه المعاهدة ( الملحق الول ) 0 وتستأنف مصر ممارسة سيادتها الكاملة على سيناء 0

3. عند اتمام الانسحاب المبدئى المنصوص عليه فى الملحق الاول يقيم الطرفان علاقات طبيعية وودية طبقا للمادة الثالثة ( فقرة 3) ثالثا : عند اتمام الانسحاب المبدئى المنصوص عليه فى الملحق الاول يقيم الطرفان علاقات طبيعية وودية طبقا للمادة الثالثة ( فقرة 3) ثالثا : عند اتمام الانسحاب المبدئى المنصوص عليه فى الملحق الاول يقيم الطرفان علاقات طبيعية وودية طبقا للمادة الثالثة ( فقرة 3)

المادة الثانية

4. ان الحدود بين مصر واسرائيل هى الحدود الدولية المعترف بها بين مصر وفلسطين تحت الانتداب كما هو واضح بالخريطة فى الملحق الثانى 0وذلك دون المساس بالوضع الخاص بغزة 0 ويعتبر الطرفان بأن هذه الحدود مصونة لا تمس ويتعهد كل منهما باحترام سلامة أراضى الطرف الآخر بما فى ذلك مياهه الاقليمية ومجاله الجوي.

المادة الثالثة

5. يطبق الطرفان فيما بينهما أحكام ميثاق الامم التحدة ومبادئ القانون الدولى التى تحكم العلاقات بين الدول فى وقت السلم وبصفة خاصة :

a. يقر الطرفان ويحترم كل منهما سيادة الآخر وسلامة أراضيه واستقلاله السياسى 0

b. يقر الطرفان ويحترم كل منهما الآخر فى أنن يعيض فى سلام داخل حدوده الآمنة والمعترف بها

c. يتعهد الطرفان بالامتناع عن التهديد باسستخدام القوة أو استخدام أحدهما ضد الآخر على نحو مباشر أو غير المباشر وتحل كافة المنازعات التى تنشأ بالوسائل السلمية

6. يتعهد كل طرف بأن يكفل عدم صدور فعل من أفعال الحرب أو الافعال العدوانية أو أفعال العنف أو التهديد بها من داخل اقليمه أو بواسطة قوات خاضعة لسيطرته أو مرابطة على أراضيه ضد السكان أو المواطنين أو الممتلكات الخاصة بالطرف الآخر كما يتعهد كل طرف بالامتناع عن التنظيم أو التحريض أو المساعدة أو الاشتراك فى فعل من أفعال الحرب أو الافعال العدوانية أو النشاط الهدام أو أفعال العنف لمواجهة ضد الطرف الآخر فى أى مكان 00 كما يتعهد بأن يكفل تقديم مرتكبى هذه الافعال للمحاكمة

7. يثفق الطرفان على أن العلاقات الطبيعية التى ستقام بينهما ستتضمن الاعتراف الكامل والعلاقات الدبلوماسية والاقتصادية والثقافية وانهاء المقاطعة الاقتصادية والحواجز ذات الطابع التمييزى المفروضة ضد حرية انتقال الافراد والسلم 00 كما يتعهد كل طرف بأن يكفل تمتع الطرف الآخر الخاضعين لاختصاصه القضائى بكافة الضمانات القانونية ويوضح البروتوكول الملحق بهذه المعاهدة ( المرفق الثالث ) الطريقة التى يتعهد الطرفان بمقتضاها التوصل الى اقامة هذه الاعلاقات وذك بالتوازى مع تنفيذ الاحكام الخرى لهذه المعاهدة

المادة الرابعة

8. بغية توفير الحد الاقصى للأمن لكلا الطرفين وذلك على اساس التبادل تقام ترتيبات أمن متفق عليها بما فى ذلك مناطق محدودة التسليح فى الاراضى المصرية والاسرائيلية وقوات أمم متحدة تفصيلا من حيث الطبيعة والتوقيت فى الملحق الاول وكذلك أى ترتيبات أمن قد يتفق عليها الطرفان

9. يتفق الطرفان على تمركز افراد الامم المتحدة فى المناطق الموضحة بالملحق الاول ويتفق الطرفان على ان يطلبا سحب هؤلاء الافراد وعلى أن سحب هؤلاء الافراد لن يتم الا بموافقة مجلس الامن التابع للامم المتحدة بما فى ذلك التصويت الايجابى للاعضاء الخمسة الدائمين بالمجلس وذلك ما لم يتفق الطرفان على خلاف ذلك 0

10. تنشأ لجنة مشتركة لتسهيل تنفيذ هذه المعاهدة وفقا لما منصوص عليه فى الملحق الأول

11. يتم بناء على طلب أحد الطرفين اعادة النظر فى ترتيبات الامن المنصوص عليها فى الفقرتين 1 ، 2 من هذه المادة وتعديلها باتفاق الطرفين

المادة الخامسة

12. تتمتع السفن الاسرائيلية والشحنات المتجهة من اسرائيل واليها بحق المرور الحر فى قناة السويس ومداخلها فى كل من خليج السويس واتلبحر الابيض المتوسط وفقا لأحكام اتفاقية القسطنطينية لعام 1888 المنطبقة على جميع الدول 0 كم يعامل رعايا اسرائيل وسفنها وشحناتها وكذلك الاشخاص والسفن والشحنات المتجهة من اسرائيل واليها معاملة لا تتسم بالتمييز فى كافة الشئون المتعلقة باستخادم القناة 13. يعتبر الطرفان أن مضيق تيران وخليج العقبة من الممرات المائية الدولية المفتوحة لكافة الدول دون عائق أو ايقاف لحرية الملاحة أو العبور الجوى 0 كما يحترم الطرفان حق كل مهما فى الملاحة والعبور الجوى من أجل الوصول الى أراضيه عبر مضيق تيران وخليج العقبة

المادة السادسة

14. لا تمس هذه المعاهدة ولا يجوز تفسيرها على اى نحو يمس بحقوق والتزامات الطرفين وفقا لميثاق الامم المتححدة

15. يتعهد الطرفان بأن ينفذا بحسن نية التزامانها الناشئة عن هذه المعاهدة بصرف النظر عن أى فعل أو امتناع عن فعل من جانب طرف آخر وبشكل مستق عن أى وثيقة خارج هذه المعاهدة

16. كما يتعهدان بأن يتخذا كافة التدابير الازمة لكى تنطبق فى علاقاتها أحكام الانفاقيات المتعددة الاطراف التى يكونان من أطرافها بما فى ذلك تقديم الاخطار المناسب للامين العام للأمم المتحدة وجهات الايداع الخرى لمثل هذه الاتفاقيات

17. يتعهد الطرفان بعدم الدخول فى أى التزام يتعارض مع هذه المعاهدة

18. مع مراعاة المادة 103 من ميثاق الامم المتحدة يقر الطرفان بأنه فى حالة وجود تناقص بين التزامات الاطراف بموجب هذه المعاهدة وأى من التزاماتها الاخرى بأن الالتزامات الناشئة عن هذه المعاهدة هى التى تكون ملزمة ونافذة

المادة السابعة

19. تحل الخلافات بشأن تطبيق أو تفسير هذه المعاهدة عن طريق المفاوضة

20. اذا لم يتيسر حل هذه الخلافات عن طريق المفاوضة تحل بالتوفيق أو تحال إلى التحكيم

المادة الثامنة

21. يتفق الطرفان على انشاء لجنة تعويضات للتسوية المتبادلة لكافة المطالبات

المادة التاسعة

22. تصبح هذه المعاهدة نافذة المفعول عند تبادل وثائق التصديق عليها

23. تحل هذه المعاهدة محل الاتفاق المعقود بين مصر واسرائيل فى سبتمبر 1975

24. تعد كافة البروتوكولات والملاحق والخرائط الملحقة بهذه المعاهدة جزءا لا يتجزأ منها

25. يتم أخطار الامين العام للأمم المتحدة بهذه المعاهدة لتسجيلها وفقا لأحكام المادة 102 من ميثاق الأمم المتحدة

26. حررت فى 26 مارس 1979 من ثلاث نسخ باللغات العربية والانجليزية والعبرية وتعتبر جميعها متساوية الحجية وفى حالة الخلاف فى التفسير فيكون النص الانجليزى هو الذ يعتد به

الفقرة الأولى

مفهوم الانسحاب

27. إسرائيل ستكمل انسحاب كل قواتها المسلحة والمدنيين من سيناء بحد أقصى خلال ثلاثة سنوات من تاريخ تبادل التصديق على هذه المعاهدة.

28. لضمان الأمن المتبادل للاطراف, ينفذ الانسحاب بشكل منظم على مراحل مصاحبة بالإجراءات العسكرية لتأسيس مناطق كما فى الخريطة رقم (1).

29. الانسحاب من سيناء سينجز في مرحلتين :

a. الانسحاب المؤقت خلف الخط من شرق العريش إلى رأس محمد كما هو موضح في الخريطة رقم 2 خلال تسعة شهور من تاريخ التصديق على هذه المعاهدة.

b. الانسحاب النهائي من سيناء خلف الحد الدولي فى موعد أقصاه ثلاثة سنوات من تاريخ التصديق على هذه المعاهدة .

30. تشكل لجنة مشتركة فورا بعد التصديق على هذه المعاهدة لكي تشرف وتنسق الحركات والجداول أثناء الانسحاب, ولضبط الخطط والجداول كضرورة خلال الحدود المنشأة بالفقرة 3, أعلاه. .

الفقرة الثانية

الحدود النهائية

31. لكي يتم توفير أقصى أمن ممكن لكلا الطرفبين بعد الانسحاب النهائي, تنشأ وتنظم الخطوط و المناطق على الخريطة كما يلي :

a. منطقة A

1. منطقة يحدها شرقاً الخط الأحمر وغرباً بقناة السويس والساحل الشرقي لخليج السويس, كما هو مبين في الخريطة رقم 1.

2. فى هذه المنطقة ستكون هناك قوة مسلحة مصرية فرقة مشاة واحدة وأجهزتها العسكرية.

3. العناصر الرئيسية لذلك التقسيم ستتكون من :

a. ثلاثة لواءات مشاة.

b. لواء مسلح واحد .

c. سبعة كتائب مدفعية حتى 126 قطعة مدفعية .

d. سبعة كتائب مدفعية مضادة للطائرات متضمنة صواريخ أرض جو وحتى 126 مسدس مضاد للطائرات ل37 مليمتر وأكثر.

e. حتى 230 دبابة .

f. حتى 480 مركبة مدرعة لكل الأنواع .

g. حتى 22 ألف موظف.

b. منطقة B

1. منطقة B حدودها من الخط الأخضر شرقاً والى الخط الأحمر غرباً كما هو موضح بالريطة رقم (1).

2. وحدات الحدود المصرية مكونة من أربعة كتائب مجهزة بالأسلحة الخفيفة والمركبات ستمد الأمن و تستكمل الشرطة المدنية في الحفاظ على النظام في منطقة B . العناصر الرئيسية في كتائب الحدود الأربعة ستتكون حتى مجموع أربعة آلاف موظف .

3. أجهزة انذار مبكر لوحدات دورية الحدود قد تنشأ على ساحل هذه المنطقة .

c. منطقة C

1. منطقة C يحدها الخط الأخضر غرباً والحد الدولي وخليج العقبة شرقاً, كما هو موضح على الخريطة 1 .

2. فقط قوات الأمم المتحدة والشرطة المدنية المصرية ستوضع في منطقة C.

3. الشرطة المدنية المصرية المسلحة بالأسلحة الخفيفة ستجري وظائف الشرطة العادية خلال هذه المنطقة .

4. قوة الأمم المتحدة ستنشر خلال منطقة C و تجري وظائفه كما هو موضح فى المادة الرابعة لهذا الملحق .

5. قوة الأمم المتحدة ستوضع بصفة أساسية في المعسكرات المستقرة خلال المناطق المبينة على الخريطة (1) , و ستنشئ أماكنها المحددة بعد المشاورات مع مصر :

a. في المنطقة ما بين 20 كم من سيناء للبحر الأبيض المتوسط ومجاور للحدود الدولية.

b. في منطقة شرم الشيخ .

d. منطقة D

1. منطقة D يحدها الخظ الأزرق شرقاً والحد الدولي على الغرب, كما هو موضح في الخريطة 1 .

2. في هذه المنطقة سيكون هناك قوة محدودة إسرائيلية أربعة كتائب المشاة, وأجهزتهم العسكرية و التحصينات و قوات المراقبة الخاصة بالأمم المتحدة .

3. القوات الإسرائيلية في منطقة D لن تتضمن الدبابات, المدفعية والصواريخ المضادة للطائرات باستثناء صواريخ أرض جو.

4. العناصر الرئيسية لكتائب المشاة الأربعة الإسرائيلية ستتكون حتى 180 مركبة مدرعة لكل الأنواع و حتى مجموع أربعة آلاف موظف. 32. الدخول عبر الحدود الدولية سوف تكون من خلال نقاط تفتيش بالشكل الذى يراه كل طرف مناسباً وتحت سيطرته . سيكون مثل هذا المدخل وفقا لقوانين و لوائح كل بلد . 33. ستكون فقط الأجهزة العسكرية, القوات و أسلحة مسموحة بصفة خاصة من قبل هذا الملحق في هذه المناطق .

الفقرة الثالثة

نظام عسكري جوي

34. تحليق طائرات عسكرية ورحلات الاستكشاف لمصر وإسرائيل مسموحة فقط على المناطق A و D على التوالي. 35. فقط طائرات غير مسلحة لمصر واسرائيل يمكنها أن تتواجد في المناطق A و D, على التوالي.

36. فقط طائرات مصرية غير مسلحة ستقلع وتهبط منطقة B و حتى ثمانية من مثل هذه الطائرات قد تتواجد في منطقة B . وحدة الحدود المصرية .,., قد تجهز بالمروحيات الغير مسلحة لإجراء وظائفهم في منطقة B .

37. الشرطة المدنية المصرية قد تجهز بمروحيات الشرطة الغير مسلحة لإجراء وظائف الشرطة العادية في منطقة C.

38. المطارات المدنية فقط يمكنها أن تبقى على الأرض فى هذه المناطق.

39. فقط تلك الأنشطة الجوية العسكرية المسموحة بصفة خاصة من قبل هذا الملحق سيسمح بها في المناطق والمجال الجوي فوق المياه الإقليمية .

الفقرة الرابعة

النظام البحري

40. مصر و إسرائيل قد تؤسسان و تشغلان السفن البحرية بطول سواحل المناطق A و D , على التوالي .

41. قوارب حرس سواحل مصرية, نصف مسلحة, قد تتواجد في المياه الإقليمية للمنطقة B لمساعدة وحدات الحدود في إجراء وظائفهم في هذه المنطقة.

42. الشرطة المدنية المصرية جهزت بالقوارب الخفيفة, نصف مسلحة, ستجري وظائف الشرطة العادية خلال المياه الإقليمية للمنطقة C . المنطقة

43. لا شيئ في هذا الملحق سيعتبر كالتقليل من حق المرور البريء للسفن البحرية لأي طرف .

44. مواني بحرية مدنية وحيدة وأجهزة قد تبنى في المناطق .

45. فقط تلك الأنشطة البحرية المسموحة بصفة خاصة من قبل هذا الملحق ستسمح في المناطق الموضحة وفي المياه الإقليمية .

الفقرة الخامسة

نظم إنذار مبكر

مصر و إسرائيل قد تنشئان و تشغلان نظم إنذار مبكر فقط في المناطق A و D على التوالي .

الفقرة السادسة

عمليات الأمم المتحدة

46. الأطراف ستطالب الأمم المتحدة أن تمد القوات والمراقبين للإشراف على تنفيذ هذا الملحق واستخدام أفضل مجهوداتهم لمنع أي انتهاك لمصطلحاته.

47. بخصوص قوات الأمم المتحدة هذه والمراقبين, كمناسب, الأطراف توافق طلب الترتيبات التالية :

a. عملية نقاط التفتيش, دوريات الاستكشاف وأبراج مراقبة بطول الحد الدولي و حدود منطقة B, و خلال المنطقة C .

b. ستنفذ مراجعة دورية لتنفيذ شروط هذا الملحق ليس أقل من مرتين كل شهر إلا إذا وافق من قبل المجموعات .

c. مراجعات إضافية خلال 48 ساعة فى حال طلب أي طرف.

d. ضمان حرية الملاحة خلال مضيق تيران وفقا للفقرة الخامسة لمعاهدة السلام.

48. الترتيبات التى وصفت في هذه الفقرة لكل منطقة ستنفذ فى مناطق A B C بقوة الأمم المتحدة و في المنطقة D من قبل مراقبي الأمم المتحدة .

49. فرق مراجعة الأمم المتحدة ستصاحب من قبل موظفي اتصال الطرف الخاص .

50. قوة الأمم المتحدة والمراقبون ستبلغ عن تحقيقاتهم إلى كلا الطرفين.

51. قوة الأمم المتحدة والمراقبون الذين يشتغلون في المناطق سيتمتعون بحرية الحركة والمرافق الأخرى الضرورية لأداء مهامهم .

52. قوة الأمم المتحدة والمراقبون لا تفوض لتوكيل معبر الحد الدولي .

53. الأطراف ستتفق على الدول التي ستكون منها قوة الأمم المتحدة والمراقبون. يكونون من دول خلاف الدول الأعضاء الدائمون لمجلس أمن الأمم المتحدة .

54. الأطراف تتفق أن الأمم المتحدة ينبغي أن تعمل ترتيبات الأمور لتأكيد التنفيذ المؤثر على مسئولياتها للاتفاق. .

الفقرة السابعة

نظام الاتصال

55. بعد حلّ اللجنة المشتركة, سيكون نظام اتصال بين الأطراف مستخدماً . نظام الاتصال هذا اعتزم لإمداد طريقة مؤثرة لتقييم التقدم في تنفيذ الواجبات تحت الملحق الحالي ولحل أي مشكلة قد تظهر في أثناء تنفيذه, و يحيل مسائل مستعصية أخرى إلى المسئولين العسكريين العالين للبلدين على التوالي للتفكير . هو أيضا لمنع مواقف تنشأ عن الأخطاء أو سوء التفسير على جزء من أي طرف.

56. مكتب اتصال مصري سينشأ في مدينة العريش و مكتب اتصال إسرائيلي سينشأ في مدينة بئر السبع . سيكون كل مكتب برئاسة ضابط البلد الخاص, و يساعده عدد من الضباط.

57. خط هاتف مباشر سيكون بين المكتبين وأيضا خطوط هاتفية مباشرة مع سيطرة الأمم المتحدة.

الفقرة الثامنة

احترام النصب التذكارية للحرب

كل طرف يتولى حفظ النصب التذكارية المشيدة للحرب في حالة جيدة وسوف يتم السماح بالدخول لمثل هذه الآثار.

الفقرة العاشرة

ترتيبات مؤقتة

انسحاب القوات المسلحة الإسرائيلية والمدنيين خلف خط الانسحاب المؤقت, و سلوك القوات للاطراف والأمم المتحدة قبيل الانسحاب النهائي, ستحكم بالملحق المرفق والخريطة رقم 2 .

.........." إنتهى النقل

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ....

ومراعاة للتوثيق التاريخى وحتى يتوفر للباحث إمكانية التقييم والبحث العلمى والأكاديمى ، أنشر فى البداية "النص الوثائقى باللغة الأنجليزية الذى وقع عليه .. ثم ننشر الملحقات والمراسلات والوثائق الأصلية بشكل وثائق بى دى إف .. نسختهم من المصدر .... مكتبة ومركز جيمى كارتر ، الرئيس الأمريكى السابق

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/index.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/accords.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/frame.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/letters.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...er25years.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...rteendays.phtml

الوثــائق الأصلية

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...documents.phtml

...."

إطار نص الأتفاقية والتوقيعات

The Camp David Accords

The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.

Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

West Bank and Gaza

Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

Egypt-Israel

Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.

In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

Associated Principles

Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

full recognition;

abolishing economic boycotts;

guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the

Arab Republic of Egypt:

Muhammed Anwar al-SadatFor the Government

of Israel:

Menachem BeginWitnessed by:

Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America

إطار نص الملحقات

The Camp David Accords

Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty

between Egypt and Israel

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;

the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).

In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed:

in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and

in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the

Arab Republic of Egypt:

Muhammed Anwar al-SadatFor the Government

of Israel:

Menachem BeginWitnessed by:

Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America

].

تم تعديل 6 مارس 2008 بواسطة يحى الشاعر

[يحى الشاعر]

مما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها - 2

فيما يلي نسخ إعداد ، وتنسيق لما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها

د. يحى الشاعر

- 2 -

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ....

تنشر عدة مواقع عربية "إتفاقية كامب ديفيد بالتفصيل ، وينشرون معها الخرائط" وذلك فى مساق حرب العبور 1973 وإتفاقية

السلام بين مصر وإسرائيل ، النى وقعها الرئيس الراحل أنور السادات ومناحيم بيجين رئيس الوزراء الأسرائيلى فى حديقة

البيت الأبيض فى واشنطن

وكان الرئيس الأمريكى جيمى كارتر والصحافة العالمية ومحطات التلفزيزن شاهدون لحفلة التوقيع

نلاحظ العسل فى البداية والسم فيما بعد

وهذا نص اتفاقية كامب ديفد التى فقدت مصر بها شرفها بعقد اتفاق رسمى

.....

يحى الشاعر

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ....

ومراعاة للتوثيق التاريخى وحتى يتوفر للباحث إمكانية التقييم والبحث العلمى والأكاديمى ، أنشر فى البداية "النص الوثائقى باللغة الأنجليزية الذى وقع عليه .. ثم ننشر الملحقات والمراسلات والوثائق الأصلية بشكل وثائق بى دى إف .. نسختهم من المصدر .... مكتبة ومركز جيمى كارتر ، الرئيس الأمريكى السابق

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/index.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/accords.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/frame.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/letters.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...er25years.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...rteendays.phtml

الوثــائق الأصلية

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...documents.phtml

...."

إطار نص الملحقات

The Camp David Accords

Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty

between Egypt and Israel

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;

the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).

In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed:

in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and

in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the

Arab Republic of Egypt:

Muhammed Anwar al-SadatFor the Government

of Israel:

Menachem BeginWitnessed by:

Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America

تم تعديل 6 مارس 2008 بواسطة يحى الشاعر

[يحى الشاعر]

مما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها - 3

فيما يلي نسخ إعداد ، وتنسيق لما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها

د. يحى الشاعر

- 3 -

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ....

تنشر عدة مواقع عربية "إتفاقية كامب ديفيد بالتفصيل ، وينشرون معها الخرائط" وذلك فى مساق حرب العبور 1973 وإتفاقية

السلام بين مصر وإسرائيل ، النى وقعها الرئيس الراحل أنور السادات ومناحيم بيجين رئيس الوزراء الأسرائيلى فى حديقة

البيت الأبيض فى واشنطن

وكان الرئيس الأمريكى جيمى كارتر والصحافة العالمية ومحطات التلفزيزن شاهدون لحفلة التوقيع

نلاحظ العسل فى البداية والسم فيما بعد

وهذا نص اتفاقية كامب ديفد التى فقدت مصر بها شرفها بعقد اتفاق رسمى

.....

يحى الشاعر

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ....

ومراعاة للتوثيق التاريخى

وحتى يتوفر للباحث إمكانية التقييم والبحث العلمى والأكاديمى ، أنشر فى البداية "النص الوثائقى باللغة الأنجليزية الذى وقع عليه .. ثم ننشر الملحقات والمراسلات والوثائق الأصلية بشكل وثائق بى دى إف .. نسختهم من المصدر .... مكتبة ومركز جيمى كارتر ، الرئيس الأمريكى السابق

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/index.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/accords.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/frame.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/letters.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...er25years.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...rteendays.phtml

الوثــائق الأصلية

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...."

الوثــائق الأصلية

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<B><B>

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

"Twenty-Five Documents After Twenty-Five Years"

[You may view these pages either in your browser with Adobe's Acrobat plug-in, or downloaded and viewed with Adobe's Acrobat Reader. If you do not have Adobe Acrobat, you can get both the plug-in and the viewer by following this Acrobat link.]

Document 1 and Document 2: These letters from President Jimmy Carter to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel were written during the first month of President Carter's administration. They indicate President Carter's early personal commitment to the Middle East peace process as well as his eagerness to meet with both Sadat and Rabin. </STRONG>

Document 3: This letter from nine United States Senators represented the support that President Carter was to have in his quest for Middle East peace.

Document 4: There were to be many obstacles to Middle East peace, and President Carter appealed to President Sadat for his support in this letter. One month later President Sadat visited Israel for the first time.

Document 5: President Sadat's plan to visit Israel solicited this speech by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who had succeeded Prime Minister Rabin after a surprise election victory.

Document 6: This President Sadat letter to President Carter recognized the international respect that was accorded to President Carter's success in negotiating the Panama Canal treaties. President Sadat also emphasized Israeli activities and negotiating positions that discouraged support of other Arab nations for the peace process.

Document 7: One week later, as President Carter prepared to meet with Prime Minister Begin, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski asserted that a renewed commitment to Israeli security should be coupled with an appeal for Begin recognition of President Sadat's requirements.

Document 8 and Document 9: On August 3, 1978, President Carter wrote private letters to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to be delivered by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The letters proposed a meeting of Carter, Sadat, and Begin at a time and location to be determined.

Document 10: President Carter's schedule for September 5, 1978, records the arrival at Camp David of First Lady Rosalynn Carter, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin.

Document 11: Ten days later President Carter sent this message to Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to suggest an honorable and respectable closure to what then appeared to be a failed peace effort.

Document 12: This is President Carter's draft of what became the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel."

Document 13: President Carter's notes indicate the difficulty of the last few hours of negotiations at Camp David.

Document 14: President Carter's schedule for September 17, 1978, records the hectic activities that culminated in a signing ceremony in the East Room of the White House late on a Sunday evening.

Document 15: The next day President Carter accepted the congratulations of former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Document 16: On Sunday, September 17, 1978, cellist Mstislav Rostropovich had been hosted by First Lady Rosalynn Carter at a White House concert as Carter, Begin, and Sadat wrapped up their Camp David discussions.

Document 17: One month later Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Both President Sadat and National Security Adviser Brzezinski believed that President Carter should have been included in the award, an honor that President Carter was eventually accorded in December, 2002.

Document 18: As this memo from Brzezinski to the President suggests, tough negotiations continued after the Camp David Accords until March, 1979.

Document 19: On March 7,1979, the President and Mrs. Carter departed for Egypt and Israel to once again bring the President's personal force to bear on the post-Camp David negotiations of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Document 20: This is the President's schedule on March 13, 1979, the day on which he finally nailed down a peace treaty agreement.

Document 21: The President and First Lady returned to Andrews Air Force Base shortly after midnight on March 14, 1979, to be welcomed back to the United States by an enthusiastic crowd of approximately one thousand people.

Document 22: March 26, 1979, featured the signing ceremony for the Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel in the afternoon on the North Lawn of the White House, followed that evening by a State Dinner on the South Lawn of the White House.

Document 23: President Carter's handwritten editing of his statement delivered at the signing ceremony demonstrates his attention to detail even to the last moment of the peace process.

Document 24 and Document 25: Despite the success of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in preserving peace between those two nations, the Middle East continued to be a volatile region throughout the Carter administration and to the present.

[يحى الشاعر]

مما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها - 4

فيما يلي نسخ إعداد ، وتنسيق لما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها

د. يحى الشاعر

- 4 -

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ....

مراعاة للتوثيق التاريخى

وحتى يتوفر للباحث إمكانية التقييم والبحث العلمى والأكاديمى ، أنشر فى البداية "النص الوثائقى باللغة الأنجليزية الذى وقع عليه .. ثم ننشر الملحقات والمراسلات والوثائق الأصلية بشكل وثائق بى دى إف .. نسختهم من المصدر .... مكتبة ومركز جيمى كارتر ، الرئيس الأمريكى السابق

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/index.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/accords.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/frame.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/letters.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...er25years.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...rteendays.phtml

الوثــائق الأصلية

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...documents.phtml

يحى الشاعر

...."

نص الخطابات المتبادلة

The Camp David Accords

Annex to the Framework Agreements

Exchanges of Letters

All letters from Mr. Carter are dated September 22, 1978, all the other letters are dated September 17, 1978.

Prime Minister Begin to President Carter

The President

Camp David

Thurmont, Maryland

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?"

The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual Parliamentary Party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both of the Government and the Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

Sincerely yours,

Menachem Begin

President Carter to President Sadat

His Excellency

Anwar Al-Sadat

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Cairo

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Enclosure: Letter from Prime Minister Begin

President Sadat to President Carter

His Excellency

Jimmy Carter

President of the United States

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements:

All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.

Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.

If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "framework" shall be void and invalid.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

President Carter to Prime Minister Begin

His Excellency

Menachem Begin

Prime Minister of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, describing how you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this subject.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Enclosure: Letter from President Sadat

President Sadat to President Carter

His Excellency

Jimmy Carter

President of the United States

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem.

Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored.

Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.

The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian People in the West Bank.

Relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the City are null and void and should be rescinded.

All peoples must have free access to the City and enjoy the free exercises of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.

The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.

Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the city shall be undivided.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

Prime Minister Begin to President Carter

The President

Camp David

Thurmont, Maryland

17 September 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 - Israel's parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "the Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the State to any part of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel - Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

Menachem Begin

President Carter to President Sadat

His Excellency

Anwar al-Sadat

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Cairo

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, setting forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

President Sadat to President Carter

His Excellency

Jimmy Carter

President of the United States

The White House

Washington, D.C.

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

President Carter to Prime Minister Begin

His Excellency

Menachem Begin

Prime Minister of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

In each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs."

In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

تم تعديل 6 مارس 2008 بواسطة يحى الشاعر

[يحى الشاعر]

فيما يلي نسخ إعداد ، وتنسيق لما هو معروف عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد وملحقاتها

د. يحى الشاعر

- 5 -

يمكن رؤية الخريطة بشكل مكبر

عند النقر عليها

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ....

مراعاة للتوثيق التاريخى

وحتى يتوفر للباحث إمكانية التقييم والبحث العلمى والأكاديمى ، أنشر فى البداية "النص الوثائقى باللغة الأنجليزية الذى وقع عليه .. ثم ننشر الملحقات والمراسلات والوثائق الأصلية بشكل وثائق بى دى إف .. نسختهم من المصدر .... مكتبة ومركز جيمى كارتر ، الرئيس الأمريكى السابق

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/index.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/accords.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...vid/frame.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...d/letters.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...er25years.phtml

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...rteendays.phtml

الوثــائق الأصلية

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/document...documents.phtml

يحى الشاعر

...."

<B><B>التقييم الأمريكى بعد 25 عاما للأحداث

وللأشخاص أنور السادات ومناحم بيجين

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

"Thirteen Days After Twenty-Five Years"

Camp David: Historic Grounds for Peace

Twenty-five years ago in the isolation and solitude of the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland, three world leaders came together seeking a way out of the years of distrust, manipulation, war, and political posturing in the Middle East. At the invitation of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt came to the secluded presidential retreat, Camp David, hoping to find avenues to peace in their troubled part of the world. Each leader took enormous risks to be there, but the successful outcome of their meetings brought immediate worldwide attention to each one's courage and resolve.

A formula for resolving conflict evolved during the Camp David meetings. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin expressed a new willingness to attempt resolution of the conflict, while U.S. President Jimmy Carter offered to serve as a mediator. He also suggested Camp David, the private presidential retreat, as a setting conducive to these meetings without the disruption of the press. When it became clear that both sides were holding to predictable statements and worn arguments, President Carter developed his own strategy of getting agreement in bite-size portions-- first from one side and then from the other. Back and forth, idea and detail, getting consensus on certain parts, outlining what still needed work, Carter convinced Begin and Sadat to stay for thirteen days until they developed and agreed upon a framework for peace.

Ancient Land, Age-Old Struggles

By 1978 the Middle East had been a region of the world embroiled in tragic conflict for centuries. The United States had been involved in efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East, in large part to avert the possibility of a world war. Because of the complex political and governmental relationships between the peoples and countries of the Middle East and the European colonial powers, this region had become one of the world's powder kegs.

In 1869, the French-built Suez Canal opened in Egypt. The Canal opened up new sources of trade for Middle Eastern countries, but gave the French and then the British a major foothold in the area. In 1917, the British Balfour Declaration stated that the Jewish people should have a homeland in Palestine, the land of their origins. When the Arab countries learned of this they protested against it, but England promised that the civil and religious status of the Arabs in Palestine would not change. In 1922 the League of Nations placed Palestine under the Mandate system, in which England was to govern the territory. After World War II, many Jewish people migrated to Palestine, seeking a homeland after the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust. However, neighboring Arab countries watched in resentment as the British allowed Palestinian Arabs to be displaced from their homes and from the areas they had cultivated for generations.

The growing Jewish population in Palestine viewed the British as an occupying force. Jewish terrorist attacks against British facilities in Palestine prompted a withdrawal by the British. In 1947, the United Nations divided the area into three parts: a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international zone around Jerusalem. The Jewish people living in Palestine declared the formation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. Israel was officially recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union. Within twenty-four hours Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq issued a protest and invaded this newly formed country. In 1949, an armistice was signed which changed the boundaries laid out in the 1947 proposal.

In 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his vice-president Anwar Sadat nationalized the Suez Canal, thus depriving the British and French of revenues they had enjoyed for nearly one hundred years. The British, French, and Israelis attacked Egypt to reclaim the Canal by force. The international community called for an end to this effort, and the British, French, and Israeli troops withdrew. Because of this successful stand against colonial power, Egypt was recognized as a leader among Middle Eastern countries.

In the Six Day War of June 1967, Israel preempted an anticipated attack by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan by launching a ground and air strike through the Sinai region of Egypt, the Golan Heights of Syria, and beyond the West Bank of the Jordan River in Jordan. The territory that Israel gained in this war established new northern, southern, and eastern borders for the country, but this territory would also be the focus of Middle Eastern dispute for years to come. Later in 1967, United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 called for a withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict, for recognition of every state in the region, for free navigation through international waterways, for a just settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem, and for established demilitarized zones. Diplomatic efforts failed when Israel did not withdraw and when Arab countries began relationships with the Soviet Union that brought them modern military weapons.

On October 6, 1973, the Egyptian army launched a successful surprise attack against Israeli forces in the Suez Canal and Sinai Desert area of Egypt. Simultaneously, Syrian forces attacked Israeli troops in the Golan Heights in an effort to reclaim territory. During this conflict, also known as the Yom Kippur War, the United States provided immediate military assistance to Israel in its counterattack, ensuring the defeat of Arab forces. In concert with this strike, the oil-producing Arab countries announced a 25% reduction in oil exports, hoping to bring pressure on western nations supporting Israel. On October 22, 1973, United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 called for a cease-fire and for immediate negotiations. A year later, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) proclaimed that it was the only legitimate representative for the Palestinian people.

President Johnson and President Nixon made diplomatic efforts to solve the recurring conflicts in the region. President Ford's Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, personally intervened to settle the tensions in the region. The Sinai Agreement of 1975, which Kissinger negotiated, called for an end to any fighting between Israel and Egypt. It also outlined a buffer zone with United Nations peacekeeping forces, but it did not resolve many of the underlying issues of the conflict.

When new Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin extended an unprecedented invitation to Egypt's President Sadat to come to Jerusalem in 1977, the world took notice. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and Prime Minister Begin's subsequent visit to Egypt showed a clear desire to move past disagreement and doubt toward peaceful resolution.

Anwar Sadat

President of Egypt Mohammed Anwar el Sadat grew up in a small village north of Cairo. He attended a British military school in Egypt even though he deeply resented British rule of his country. After graduation, Sadat met Gamal Abdel Nasser. They formed a revolutionary group composed of military officers, the Free Officers Organization, that committed itself to overthrowing British rule. Anwar Sadat was imprisoned twice for revolutionary activities, but on July 23, 1952, the Free Officers Organization deposed King Farouk, the British puppet monarch. Sadat served as Nasser's right-hand man and personally supervised the King's abdication. When Nasser became President of Egypt, Sadat served as vice-president until Nasser's death in 1970.

Upon assuming the presidency, Sadat was faced with severe domestic problems caused by the growing failure of socialism, the economic drain of the Six Day War, and the constant prospect of more war in the future. Finding the Soviet Union an unreliable ally, he worked toward a better relationship with the United States and Western Europe.

In a series of daring gestures, he charted a new course for Egypt. He expelled Soviet advisors from Egypt and began to reform the economy. On October 6, 1973, he launched a surprise attack against Israeli forces in the Sinai in order to reclaim this Egyptian peninsula captured during the 1967 Six Day War. Even though the military strike was only initially successful, it was a psychological victory and Sadat became known as "The Hero of the Crossing." In spite of new western investment and U.S. aid, the economy continued to decline, resulting in work strikes and riots over food shortages. Sadat, convinced that war was too costly for his people, took a grand and unprecedented step onto the world stage. He traveled to Jerusalem at the invitation of Prime Minister Begin and addressed the Israeli Knesset (parliament) on November 20, 1977, calling for peace in the Middle East.

Menachem Begin

Menachem Wolfovitch Begin grew up in Brest-Litovsk, Poland. Greatly influenced by the ideas of Ze'ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky, he joined the Betar Zionist movement in Poland. By 1935, he had earned a law degree from the University of Warsaw and became the leader of Betar. This political organization encouraged young people of Jewish ancestry to embrace their heritage, learn Hebrew, and return to the land of Palestine to establish a homeland-"Eretz Yisrael."

When the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939, Begin left for the Soviet Union. He later discovered that his parents and brother had been killed during the Holocaust. He was arrested in the Soviet Union, charged with espionage, and sentenced to a prison camp in Siberia. In 1941, he was released because he was a Polish citizen. He joined the Free Polish Army and then served in the British Army in Palestine as an interpreter. During this time, he became active in the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine and became a leader of Irgun Zvai Leumi-- a liberation movement dedicated to overthrowing British rule. After Irgun blew up a wing of the King David Hotel-- the British headquarters in Jerusalem-- Begin was listed on the British "most wanted" register.

After British withdrawal from Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel, Begin became the leader of the Herut Party, an opposition party in the Israeli Knesset. In 1967, he joined the National Unity government. In 1970, he became the joint chairman of the Likud (unity) coalition. Because of economic scandal and disagreements within the majority Labor Party, the Likud bloc won a 1977 election victory, and Begin became Israel's sixth Prime Minister.

A skilled orator and debater, Begin was the first Israeli Prime Minister to refer to the West Bank region of the Jordan River by the Biblical names, Judea and Samaria. The Likud campaign platform had insisted on the rights of Jews to settle in any part of their occupied territories. It also called for negotiating a comprehensive framework for peace in the region rather than a step-by-step approach.

After Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, Prime Minister Begin in turn made a historic visit to Ismailia, a small town along the Suez Canal zone, on December 25. He was the first Israeli prime minister to set foot in Egypt.

Breaking Ground

Because of the volatile nature of events in the Middle East, U.S. presidents from Truman through Nixon each had to address a regional crisis sometime during his term of office. With the Soviet Union as a major player, each president had to face the possibility of a world war. The cycle of bombings and retaliations, border skirmishes, instability, and general uneasiness could lead to full-scale military confrontation at any time. President Carter wanted to prevent such a crisis instead of reacting to it. He sensed that the time was right to intervene personally. He recognized in Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat two men that were deeply religious and held a sense of destiny about their lives. Carter referred to Sadat as "a modern-day pharaoh" and to Begin as a leader "charged with the future of God's chosen people." In an unprecedented move, he invited new Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar Sadat to Camp David to meet privately with him, two leaders that he believed could make crucial decisions.

By July 1978, President Carter had met both Sadat and Begin as well as the other Middle East heads of state. Carter was well-acquainted with the history of the region, the issues of disagreement, the different points of view, and U.S. policy concerns, but he recognized in these two men a genuine desire to resolve the problems of their part of the world. As a student of the Bible, well-versed in the ancient struggles of this part of the world, Carter approached both leaders with political understanding and a unique sense of purpose. In preparation for the Camp David meetings, Carter studied briefing materials, including detailed maps and complete profiles of Sadat and Begin and their close advisors. President Carter's strategy was to limit the place and time of these face-to-face negotiations and to involve only those who had the authority to make agreements. He hoped that his personal intervention would serve as a catalyst for the negotiations by pointing to new approaches and reminding them of the advantages of peace.

Delegation representing Egypt:

Anwar el-Sadat, President

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Osama el-Baz, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Ashraf Ghorbal, Ambassador to the United States

Ahmed Maher, Director of the Foreign Minister's Cabinet

Abdul Raul el-Reedy, Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry

Nabil el-Araby, Legal Director of the Foreign Ministry

Ahmed Abou el-Gheite, Office of the Foreign Minister

Delegation representing Israel:

Menachem Begin, Prime Minister

Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister

Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister

Aharon Barak, Attorney General and Member-designate of the Supreme Court

Avraham Tamir, Major General, Director of Army Planning Branch

Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States

Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Minister

Elyakim Rubenstein, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister

Delegation representing U.S.:

Jimmy Carter, President

Walter Mondale, Vice President

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor

Hamilton Jordan, Chief of Staff

Jody Powell, Press Secretary

Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs

Alfred Atherton, Ambassador at Large

Hermann Eilts, Ambassador to Egypt

Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel

William Quandt, Staff of National Security Council

Preparing for the Press

President Carter insisted that there be no direct press coverage of these meetings. He feared that if President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin had to tailor each statement to meet public opinion, they would not be completely open and honest in the discussions. Instead, Carter and the White House staff determined that this insulation from the press would allow the delegations to work out ideas and language without the pressure of daily progress or the fear of being misquoted.

Because of the high level and visibility of such a meeting, White House Press Secretary Jody Powell and Communications Advisor Jerry Rafshoon were flooded with requests from the media to cover this event. White House staff made extensive preparations for members of the press from all over the world.

September 6

"Habemus Pacem" -Begin

"I hope the spirit of King David will prevail at Camp David" -Sadat

Sadat and Begin met the Carters outside Aspen, the President's cabin, before their first meeting. Mrs. Carter wrote later:

"Jimmy and I went on into our cabin and then an interesting moment-- Begin and Sadat both hesitating over who should enter first. Then they both laughed and Begin insisted that Sadat enter first. We had watched, as had a handful of people outside, and Jimmy said to me that Begin would never go ahead of Sadat, being perfectly proper according to protocol-- President above Prime Minister."

Later in the day, the three men used the patio outside Aspen for further discussions. They talked about three issues: 1) the Sinai peninsula between Egypt and Israel, 2) the ownership of the West Bank and Gaza areas bordering Israel, and 3) the role that Palestinian people would have in governing themselves.

All the parties had arrived on Tuesday, September 5 with high expectations. They asked the world to pray that peace could be achieved through these meetings. Jimmy Carter knew this venture would only work if he could convince these men to trust him. Not only did he have to listen carefully to what was said during these meetings, but the President also had to notice the unspoken word or phrase and read each face and gesture.

September 7

"Sinai settlements must stay!" -Begin

"Security yes! Land no!" -Sadat

The discussions between Sadat and Begin escalated into heated arguments, while Carter tried to referee. One of the central debates focused on Israeli settlements in the Sinai region. Sadat insisted they be removed, and Begin claimed that dismantling them would mean the fall of his government.

Mrs. Carter recorded the following:

"When the meeting was over at 1:30, Jimmy dictated his notes about the session and then met with Cy [Vance] and Zbig [brzezinski]. I sat in. He said the meeting was mean. I had heard raised voices from the bedroom where I was working. They were brutal with each other, personal, and he had had to break into arguments at certain points. He said that he made notes, looking down at his pad so they would have to talk with each other instead of to him. Sometimes when their words became too heated he had to break in."

Later that evening, all the delegations, the press, the Camp David staff and their families, and the three principals gathered for the performance of a Marine Evening Dress Parade. Two companies of Marines and the Marine Drum and Bugle Corps performed on the grounds of Camp David. A serious and somber mood covered the camp during the ten-minute "silent drill" -- a precision rifle drill with no verbal commands.

Jimmy Carter's notes from the afternoon meeting outlined questions and deep differences between the two leaders.

"Sadat announced angrily that a stalemate had been reached. He saw no reason for the discussions to continue. [begin and Sadat] were moving toward the door, but I got in front of them to partially block the way. I urged them not to break off their talks... Begin agreed... Sadat nodded his head. They left without speaking to each other." --Jimmy Carter from Keeping Faith

September 8

"The atmosphere between the two of you is not conducive to any agreement." --Carter

Because Sadat and Begin were no longer on speaking terms, President Carter decided that he would act as the go-between, hashing out proposals with one leader and then the other. The U.S. negotiating team also met separately with the Israeli and Egyptian teams.

That evening, the Israeli delegation played host to the Americans at a Friday evening dinner to observe the beginning of the Jewish Sabbath. The meal preparations at Camp David were complicated because the staff had to accommodate Jewish and Moslem dietary laws. The Aspen cabin kitchen became "command central" for the regular Camp David cooks, President Sadat's personal chef, and for the Jewish kosher cooks. In fact, a separate section of the kitchen was designated to prepare the kosher food and was equipped with utensils that were exclusively used for these dishes.

Religious observances were important in the scheduling during these meetings. President Sadat used the camp movie theater for private prayer on Friday; the Carters used the same space as a chapel for Sunday services; and Prime Minister Begin requested that no meetings be set for Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath.

Mrs. Carter noted the following:

"Everybody at the dinner was in a very good mood. I think because it was the Sabbath. Begin told me they always observed the Sabbath with rejoicing and singing because the Bible said that you cannot serve God with sadness. They all sang during dinner, and laughed, and it was a good evening."

September 10

Because the atmosphere at Camp David was becoming claustrophobic, President Carter asked his staff to plan an excursion to nearby Gettysburg National Military Park for a change of scenery and a reminder of the need for peace.

"Sadat, not surprisingly, was very interested in our Civil War. He knew much of the history of the area...and recalled the details of the battle. Begin, an admirer of Abraham Lincoln, recited the Gettysburg address to us..." --Rosalynn Carter from First Lady from Plains

In the evening, members of the American delegation went over some new proposals with members of the Israeli delegation. They met from nine-thirty at night to three in the morning-- five and one-half hours-- agonizing over key words and phrases and arguing about their meanings.

September 12

"If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning." -Begin

The discussions among the delegations continued, but Sadat and Begin met separately with Carter. Both men talked openly and honestly with Carter. Both still had serious concerns and became emotional about the status of the city of Jerusalem.

Land, always the source of Middle East conflict, remained the major sticking point. After Carter realized that agreement might hinge on the status of the Sinai peninsula, he decided to draft a proposal --"Framework for a Settlement in the Sinai."

"I decided to work that afternoon on the terms for an Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and spread the Sinai maps out on the dining table to begin this task, writing the proposed agreement on a yellow scratch pad."--Jimmy Carter from Keeping Faith

President Carter noted a passionate appeal from Begin. He told Carter that this was the most serious conversation he had had since he discussed the future of Israel with his mentor Ze'ev Jabotinsky.

September 13

Determined to reach agreement on a framework for peace, Carter and Vance spent eleven hours with Aharon Barak from Israel and Osama el-Baz from Egypt to work out the detailed language of the framework proposal. As they hammered out the language of each phrase, both Barak and el-Baz demonstrated their astute legal minds and their excellent knowledge of English. When differences in language stopped progress, President Carter suggested that "West Bank" be used in the English and Arabic texts, while "Judea and Samaria" be used in the Hebrew version; "Palestinians" in the English and Arabic, yet "Palestinian Arabs" in the Hebrew. He would explain the change in a letter to Begin. The letter would be attached to any formal agreement they would reach. The letter exchange idea became a critical factor in making progress toward agreement.

Because of the news blackout, many outside Camp David assumed that an agreement had already been reached. Even the Camp David staff had expected that after a few days of "ceremonial" meetings, the three leaders would announce success and leave. Instead, the camp staff was stretched to its limit trying to provide for the needs of all the participants.

September 15

"We can go no further." -Carter

"I am leaving." -Sadat

President Sadat could not agree to leave Israeli settlements and airfields in the Sinai peninsula, and Prime Minister Begin could not agree to remove these settlements. Without agreement on these issues, there did not appear to be any way to continue. Carter had already told the delegations that Sunday, September 17, would be the last day of the meetings. He had requested that all the delegations work on a joint statement about the meetings, emphasizing the positive accomplishments.

Upset by a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan, President Sadat suddenly called for a helicopter and announced to Vance that he was leaving. Carter, fearful of such an abrupt end to the meetings, rushed over to Sadat's cabin for a highly personal and dramatic encounter in which he convinced Sadat to stay.

"I explained to [sadat] the extremely serious consequences. . . that his action would harm the relationship between Egypt and the United States, he would be violating his personal promise to me. . . [and] damage one of my most precious possessions-- his friendship and our mutual trust." --Jimmy Carter from Keeping Faith

September 16

"Ultimatum, Excessive Demands, Suicide" -Begin

Even though the progress of the talks was faltering, Carter's determination to reach agreement remained strong. In another negotiating session with Begin, Barak, and Dayan, Carter and Vance made a case for peace, going through the Sinai framework and the Framework for Peace line by line.

Carter explained to Begin that Sadat would not continue negotiations toward a peace treaty until the Israeli settlements in the Sinai region were removed. After a storm of protest, Begin finally agreed to submit the question of settlements to the Israeli Knesset for a decision--If any agreement is reached on all other Sinai issues, will all the settlers be withdrawn? He even promised to allow each Knesset and Cabinet member to vote individually, without the requirements of political party loyalty. This was acceptable to Sadat!

Carter explained to Sadat that Begin would not allow the phrase "inadmissability of acquisition of territory by war" to be part of the Framework for Peace. [1967 U.N. Resolution 242, which contains this phrase, is to be found in the annex of the Framework. Begin claimed that it did not apply to Israel because the 1967 War was a defensive war for his country.] Begin insisted that only permanent residents of the West Bank and Gaza areas, not all Palestinians, participate in future peace negotiations. Sadat agreed to write one letter defining Egypt's role in these negotiations and one letter stating his position on an undivided Jerusalem. This was acceptable to Begin!

All through the meetings, Carter continued to remind Sadat and Begin how much each had to gain in making peace.

September 17

"... a significant achievement in the cause of peace..." -Carter

The last day developed into a flurry of writing and re-writing final versions of the agreements. Because both Begin and Sadat were dissatisfied with the paragraph on Jerusalem, it was deleted from the Framework.

When Begin read the U.S. letter on the status of Jerusalem, he strongly objected to it and threatened not to sign any agreement. At another moment of crisis, Carter changed the letter by dropping the objectionable language and instead referred to statements made by American U.N. ambassadors about Jerusalem.

"I handed [begin] the photographs. ... [He] looked at each photograph individually, repeating the name of the grandchild I had written on it. His lips trembled, and tears welled up in his eyes. He told me a little about each child... We were both emotional as we talked quietly for a few minutes about grandchildren and about war. ... He said, 'I will accept the letter you have drafted on Jerusalem.'" --Jimmy Carter from Keeping Faith

After one more round with Begin on the motion he would submit for a vote by the Israeli Knesset, the delegations finally have two agreements that their leaders could sign-- A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. They returned to Washington for the official signing ceremony of the Camp David Accords.

Three scheduled days at Camp David turned into thirteen intensely frustrating ones. When the three-way negotiations began on Wednesday, September 6, 1978, Carter found both Sadat and Begin clinging to old arguments and repetitious statements. After two days, despite some amicable moments, President Carter felt that more progress could be made if they did not meet directly. He spent much of his time listening intently to heated arguments and realized that a whole new approach was needed. By Saturday, September 9, Carter worked with a team led by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to draft an American proposal. President Carter implemented a "single text" strategy. The draft incorporated the needs and requirements of both sides. Then he took this draft separately to each party for points of agreement and disagreement. After twenty-three drafts and continuous debates on wording, the U.S. delegation came up with a final framework agreement on Sunday, September 17, that the Egyptians and the Israelis could agree on. The points of disagreement were left out of this framework and instead were written in letters to each other. Resulting in the comprehensive Camp David Accords, these meetings laid the groundwork for further negotiations, and for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

From Dividing Wounds to Binding Words

On September 17, 1978, the Camp David Accords were signed. These documents established A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and a Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel. Within the outline of these agreements, the two signatory countries would work out other issues leading to a peace treaty and later would involve other neighboring countries. The following day, President Carter addressed a joint session of Congress to explain the agreements and to reiterate active U.S. support for a continuing peace process. The three leaders received hearty congratulations for their boldness as the world watched to see what would happen after the Camp David meetings.

Mrs. Carter wrote in her notes that Prime Minister Begin turned to his wife and said, "Mama, we'll go down in the history books!"

Two days after the Camp David Accords were signed, President Carter went to Capitol Hill to formally address Congress. Mrs. Carter recalled the following:

"...in the car he [Jimmy] asked how 'Blessed are the peacemakers' ended, and I said 'for they shall inherit the earth.' He said no, I think it is 'for they shall be called the children of God'-- and he was right."

President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin sat in the gallery with the Carter family during the Address to Congress.

Ten days later, the Israeli Knesset voted on the Camp David Accords. After much debate on the issue of dismantling settlements in the Sinai, the Knesset approved by a vote of 84 to 19, with 17 abstentions. Secretary of State Vance, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and Secretary of Defense Brown spent the next months traveling and meeting not only with Israeli and Egyptian leaders but also with leaders of the other Arab countries. President Sadat faced heavy criticism from Arab leaders, and Prime Minister Begin had to answer opposing factions within Israel. Even though Egypt and Israel wanted a peace treaty and had an outline for preparing one, they again needed the United States to negotiate the agreement.

Begin and Sadat had said that there would be a treaty at the end of 1978. By March of 1979, there was still no progress. Once again, President Carter decided that he would intervene in a dramatic way by personally visiting Egypt and Israel. As he did at Camp David, Carter again reminded Sadat and Begin of what peace would mean to the people of the Middle East. After seven days, they agreed on a schedule for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, a promise that Israel could access oil from Sinai oilfields, and timing for the exchange of Egyptian and Israeli ambassadors.

On March 26, 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed with a grand ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House. The desire for peace had won the day. The search for peace continues today in the Middle East, yet the discussions held in Camp David cabins twenty-five years ago laid a new, strong and hopeful foundation for future efforts

تم تعديل 6 مارس 2008 بواسطة يحى الشاعر

[يحى الشاعر]

سيعاد إدماج الجزء الصحيح حسب تسلسله المنطقي

تم تعديل 6 مارس 2008 بواسطة يحى الشاعر

[يحى الشاعر]

كامب ديفيد والسيادة المجروحة فى سيناء

" ارقام و حقائق "

محمد سيف الدولة

يتحدثون عن السيادة ، فليكن ، فنحن لسنا اقل حرصا على امن مصر وسيادتها . فدعونا نتحاور ونتحاسب ونتداول حقائق الامور، وارجو ان تتسع صدورنا لتفاعل موضوعى هادىء حول الاصلح لوطننا المشترك .. ولنبدأ بالامور الاكثر جدية واكثر تاثيرا على امننا القومى .

سنتناول فى هذه الورقة انتهاك السيادة الوطنية المصرية فى سيناء بناء على اتفاقية السلام المصرية الاسرائيلية الموقعة عام 1979 ، وسيتم التركيز فيها على محورين اساسيين ، الاول : هو التدابير الامنية الواردة فى الاتفاقية والثاني هو القوات الاجنبية الموجودة فى سيناء :

اولاـ التدابير الامنية :

وهى ما ورد فى الملحق الاول من الاتفاقية ( الملحق الامنى ) ، ولقد وردت به القيود الاتية على حجم وتوزيع القوات المصرية فى سيناء :

· تم لاول مرة تحديد خطين حدودين دوليين بين مصر وفلسطين ، وليس خطا واحدا ، الاول يمثل الحدود السياسية الدولية المعروفة وهو الخط الواصل بين مدينتى رفح وطابا ، اما خط الحدود الدولى الثانى فهو الخط العسكرى او الامنى وهو الخط الواقع على بعد 58 كم شرق قناة السويس والمسمى بالخط (أ).

· ولقد قسمت سيناء من الناحية الامنية الى ثلاثة شرائح طولية سميت من الشرق الى الغرب بالمناطق ( ا ) و ( ب ) و (ج )

· اما المنطقة (أ) فهى المنطقة المحصورة بين قناة السويس والخط (أ) المذكور عاليه بعرض 58 كم ، وفيها سمح لمصربفرقة مشاة ميكانيكية واحدة تتكون من 22 الف جندى مشاة مصرى مع تسليح يقتصر على 230دبابة و126 مدفع ميدانى و126 مدفع مضاد للطائرات عيار 37مم و480 مركبة

· ثم المنطقة (ب) وعرضها 109 كم الواقعة شرق المنطقة (أ) وتقتصر على 4000 جندى من سلاح حرس الحدود مع اسلحة خفيفة

· ثم المنطقة (ج) وعرضها 33 كم وتنحصر بين الحدود الدولية من الغرب والمنطقة (ب) من الشرق و لا يسمح فيها باى تواجد للقوات المسلحة المصرية وتقتصر على قوات من الشرطة ( البوليس)

· ويحظر انشاء اى مطارات او موانى عسكرية فى كل سيناء

· فى مقابل هذه التدابيرفى مصر قيدت الاتفاقية اسرائيل فقط فى المنطقة (د) التى تقع غرب الحدود الدولية وعرضها 4 كم فقط ، وحدد فيها عدد القوات بـ 4000 جندى

· وللتقييم والمقارنة ، بلغ حجم القوات المصرية التى كانت الموجودة شرق القناة على ارض سيناء فى يوم 28 اكتوبر1973 بعد التوقف الفعلى لاطلاق النار ، حوالى 80 الف جندى مصرى واكثر من الف دبابة .

· ولكن الرئيس الراحل انور السادات وافق على سحبها جميعا واعادتها الى غرب القناة ما عدا 7000 جندى وثلاثون دبابة ، وذلك فى اتفاق فض الاشتباك الاول الموقع فى 18 يناير 1974 ،

· ان مراجعة خطة العدوان الاسرائيلى على سيناء فى حربى 1956 و1967 ، تثير القلق فيما اذا كانت الترتيبات الحالية قادرة على رد عدوان مماثل لا قدر الله .

· وللتذكرة فلقد تم العدوان الاسرائيلى عام 1967 على اربعة محاور :

1. محور رفح ، العريش ، القنطرة

2. محور العوجة ، ابو عجيلة ، الاسماعيلية

3. محور الكنتلا ، نخل ، السويس

4. محور ايلات ، دهب ، شرم الشيخ جنوبا ثم الطور ، ابو زنيمة شمالا ليلتقى مع هجوم المحور الثالث القادم من راس سدر

· وتجدر الاشارة الى ان المنطقة المسلحة الوحيدة (أ) تنتهى قبل ممرات الجدى ومتلا والخاتمية التى تمثل خط الدفاع الرئيسى عن سيناء .

· سبق للرئيس السادات ان رفض هذا الوضع ، اذ انه صرح فى 19 مارس 1974 " آن الحديث الدائر في اسرائيل عن نزع سلاح سيناء يجب آن يتوقف 0 فاذا كانوا يريدون نزع سلاح سيناء فسوف اطالب بنزع سلاح اسرائيل كلها 0 كيف انزع سلاح سيناء 00انهم يستطيعون بذلك العودة في وقت يريدون خلال ساعات "

ثانيا : القوات الاجنبية فى سيناء :

وهى القوات متعددة الجنسية MFO او ذو" القبعات البرتقالية " كما يطلق عليها للتمييز بينها وبين قوات الامم المتحدة ذو القبعات الزرقاء . ويهمنا هنا التاكيد على الاتى :

· نجحت امريكا واسرائيل فى استبدال الدور الرقابى للامم المتحدة المنصوص عليه فى المعاهدة ، بقوات متعددة الجنسية ، وقع بشانها بروتوكول بين مصر واسرائيل فى 3 اغسطس 1981.

· تتشكل القوة من 11 دولة ولكن تحت قيادة مدنية امريكية

· ولا يجوز لمصر بنص المعاهدة ان تطالب بانسحاب هذه القوات من اراضيها الا بعد الموافقة الجماعية للاعضاء الدائمين بمجلس الامن .

· وتقوم القوة بمراقبة مصر، اما اسرائيل فتتم مراقبتها بعناصر مدنية ، ومن هنا جاء اسمها " القوات متعددة الجنسية والمراقبون " MFO

· وليس من المستبعد ان يكون جزءا من القوات الامريكية فى سيناء عناصر اسرائيلية بهويات امريكية وهمية او مزورة .

· وفيما يل بعض التفاصيل :

· تتحدد وظائف MFO فى خمسة مهمات = ( 4 + 1 ) هى :

1. تشغيل نقاط التفتيش ودوريات الاستطلاع ومراكز المراقبة على امتداد الحدود الدولية وعلى الخط ( ب ) وداخل المنطقة ( ج )

2. التحقق الدورى من تنفيذ احكام الملحق الامنى مرتين فى الشهر على الاقل ما لم يتفق الطرفان على خلاف ذلك

3. اجراء تحقيق اضافى خلال 48 ساعة بناء على طلب احد الاطراف

4. ضمان حرية الملاحة فى مضيق تيران

5. المهمة الخامسة التى اضيفت فى سبتمبر2005 هى مراقبة مدى التزام قوات حرس الحدود المصرية بالاتفاق المصرى الاسرائيلى الموقع فى اول سبتمبر 2005 والمعدل فى 11 يوليو 2007 ( ملاحظة : لم يعلن عن هذا الاتفاق ولا نعلم ما جاء به ، ولقد وقع بعد سيطرة حماس على غزة )

· مقر قيادة القوة فى روما ولها مقرين اقليميين فى القاهرة وتل ابيب

· المدير الامريكى الحالى يدعى جيمس لاروكو James A. Larocco ومدة خدمته اربعة سنوات بدأها فى 24 يوليو 2004 ولقد شارك فى مفاوضات السلام المصرية الاسرائيلية عام 1979، كما عمل من قبل فى الكويت والسعودية وافغانستان وباكستان وبنجلاديش واسرائيل .

· وكان المدير السابق يدعى آرثر هيوز امريكى الجنسية ايضا وكذلك سيكون التاليين بنص البروتكول .

· تتمركزالقوات فى قاعدتين عسكرتين : الاولى فى الجورة فى شمال سيناء بالمنطقة ( ج ) والثانية بين مدينة شرم الشيخ وخليج نعمة

· بالاضافة الى ثلاثين مركز مراقبة

· ومركز اضافى فى جزيرة تيران الخاضعة للسعودية لمراقبة حركة الملاحة !

· ملاحظة : ( السعودية لا تعترف باسرائيل فكيف تكون طرفا فى الترتيبات الامنية لكامب ديفيد )

التكوين وتوزيع القوات :

· تتكون من قيادة وثلاثة كتائب مشاة لا تزيد عن 2000 جندى ودورية سواحل ووحدة مراقبة ووحدة طيران حربية ووحدات دعم واشارة

· الكتائب الثلاثة هى كتيبة امريكية تتمركز فى قاعدة شرم الشيخ والكتيبتين الاخرتين احداهما من كولومبيا والاخرى من فيجى وتتمركزان فى الجورة فى الشمال وباقى القوات من باقى الدول موزعة على باقى الوحدات وفيما يلى جدول يبين عدد وتوزيع وجنسية القوات :

الدولة

طبيعة القوات

عدد الافراد

الولايات المتحدة

كتيبة مشاة فى شرم الشيخ

425

الولايات المتحدة

وحدة طبية ووحدة مفرقعات ومكتب القيادة المدنية

235

الولايات المتحدة

القيادة العسكرية

27

كولومبيا

كتيبة مشاة فى الجورة فى الشمال

358

فيجى

كتبة مشاة فى الجورة فى الشمال

329

المملكة المتحدة

القيادة العسكرية

25

كندا

القيادة العسكرية والارتباط وشئون الافراد

28

فرنسا

القيادة العسكرية والطيران

15

بلغاريا

الشرطة العسكرية

41

ايطاليا

دورية سواحل من ثلاثة سفن لمراقبة الملاحة فى المضيق وخليج العقبة

75

نيوزيلاندا

دعم وتدريب واشارة

27

النرويج

القيادة العسكرية ومنها قائد القوات الحالى

6

اورجواى

النقل والهندسة

87

يلاحظ من الجدول السابق ما يلى :

· تضطلع الولايات المتحدة بمسئولية القيادة المدنية الدائمة للقوات كما ان لها النصيب الاكبر فى عدد القوات 687 من 1678 فرد بنسبة 40 %

· وذلك رغم انها لاتقف على الحياد بين مصر واسرائيل ، ( راجع مذكرة التفاهم الامريكية الاسرائيلية الموقعة فى 25 مارس 1979 والتى تعتبر احد مستندات المعاهدة .)

· وقد اختارت امريكا التمركز فى القاعدة الجنوبية فى شرم الشيخ للاهمية الاستراتيجية لخليج العقبة والمضايق بالنسبة لاسرائيل

· رغم ان جملة عدد القوات لا يتعدى 2000 فردا ، الا ان كافية للاحتفاظ بالمواقع الاستراتيجية لصالح اسرائيل فى حالة وقوع اى عدوان مسقبلى منها ، خاصة فى مواجهة قوات من الشرطة المصرية فقط فى المنطقة ( ج )

· ان الوضع الخاص للقوات الامريكية فى بناء الـ MFO قد يضع مصر فى مواجهة مع امريكا فى ظل اى ازمة محتملة ، مما سيمثل حينئذ ضغطا اضافيا على اى قرار سياسى مصرى .

· تم استبعاد كل الدول العربية والاسلامية من المشاركة فى هذه القوات

· ومعظم الدول الاخرى عدد قواتها محدود وتمثيلها رمزى فيما عدا كولومبيا وفيجى

· ان القيادة العسكرية كلها من دول حلف الناتو

الميزانية والتمويل :

· تقدر الميزانية السنوية الحالية للقوات 65 مليون دولار امريكى

· تتقاسمها كل من مصر وماسرائيل

· بالاضافة الى تمويل اضافى من اليابان والمانيا وسويسرا

وفى اسرائيل :

اما على الجانب الاخر فى المنطقة (د) فلا يوجد اكثر من 50 فردا كلهم مدنيون واكثر من ثلثهم امريكيين.

كان ما سبق هو حجم ازمة السيادة فى سيناء ،

اما عن السبيل للخروج منها ، فان هذا حديث آخر.

* * *

16 فبراير 2008

[يحى الشاعر]

إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ..من النص والملحقاتبالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام

سأبدأ في نشر ، ما هو متوفر من صور ونص ، عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد ، حتي نتمكن من الحصول علي أكب قدر من المعلومات عن هذه الأتفاقية

وستحظي تلك الأتفاقية وإتفاقيات أخري / بإهتمام مركز ، حتي نتمكن من تقييمهمهم .. وتحليلهم .. ومقارنة عواقبهم علي الدول العربية .. ومصر .. والمنطقة

إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ..من النص والملحقاتبالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام

د. يحي الشاعر

http://img468./img468/8562/saina6ce686yi2.jpg

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد

من النص والملحقات بالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام في 1978- 1 -

بالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام في 1978

إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ..من النص والملحقاتبالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام

سأبدأ في نشر ، ما هو متوفر من صور ونص ، عن إتفاقية كامب دافيد ، حتي نتمكن من الحصول علي أكب قدر من المعلومات عن هذه الأتفاقية

إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ..من النص والملحقات بالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام

وستحظي تلك الأتفاقية وإتفاقيات أخري / بإهتمام مركز ، حتي نتمكن من تقييمهمهم .. وتحليلهم .. ومقارنة عواقبهم علي الدول العربية .. ومصر .. والمنطقة

د. يحي الشاعر

من إتفاقية كامب ديفيد

من النص والملحقات بالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام في 1978- 1 -

بالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام في 1978

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http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie11.jpg

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http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie21.jpg

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[يحى الشاعر]

إتفاقية كامب ديفيد ..من النص والملحقاتبالوثائق معاهدة السلام من واقع جريدة الأهرام

http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie10.jpg

http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie11.jpg

http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie12.jpg

http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie13.jpg

http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie14.jpg

http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie15.jpg

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http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie18.jpg

http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie19.jpg

http://servimg.com/u/10/04/61/03/aucaie20.jpg

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