الدعم الامريكي لإسرائيل عام 73

[ابو حلاوه]

مقالة مفصلة عن دور الدعم الامريكي لإسرائيل في حرب 6 اكتوبر و تاثير ذلك علي مجريات الحرب

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المقال موجود في الصفحة الأتيه و لكنه لا يفتح

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchro.../krisinger.html

Published Aerospace Power Journal - Spring 1989

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Operation Nickel Grass

Airlift in Support of National Policy

Capt Chris J. Krisinger, USAF

ON 6 October 1973, while the state of Israel observed the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, war burst upon the Middle East. Egyptian and Syrian forces struck simultaneously against the frontiers of Israel in what would be the fourth Middle East war in 25 years. In his book The Arab-Israeli Wars, Chaim Herzog commented that the attack was the equivalent of the NATO forces in Europe being flung against Israel.1 Attacking in midafternoon, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal at three points and moved into the Sinai Peninsula while, to the northeast, Syrian troops overran Israeli-occupied positions in the Golan Heights. After initial Arab successes, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) held and by 10 October counterattacked, first in the Golan Heights area, where they drove to within 30 miles of Damascus, and a week later in the Sinai, where they eventually pushed the Egyptians back across the Suez Canal.

The ferocity of the combat severely depleted the equipment and military stockpiles of both sides, and the need for resupply became urgent. The Soviets responded to requests Egypt and Syria and, while US observers looked on with growing apprehension, began airlifting military supplies into those countries aboard An-12 and An-22 transport aircraft.2 The United States delayed the resupply of Israel to conduct diplomatic negotiations with Moscow to restore peace in the area; however, it became apparent that those talks would succeed only by reestablishing the military balance through a massive resupply of war material to Israel.

US officials considered various delivery methods that did not require military airlift forces to enter the war zone.3 They rejected sealift because the prohibitively long time necessary for delivery would fail to meet Israel's urgent requirements. Airlift was the only viable alternative, and plans were quickly drawn to accomplish the necessary resupply. On 13 October President Nixon made the decision to begin the airlift, and on the following day the first US military transport, a C-5, landed at Lod International Airport, Tel Aviv. The American airlift, dubbed Operation Nickel Grass, was under way.4

By midnight on 14 November, one month later, the United States completed an airlift of immense proportions--an effort that played a decisive role in preventing the defeat of Israel.5 Although less publicized than the belligerents' combat operations, the aerial resupply efforts of Operation Nickel Grass were significant. For the United States, Nickel Grass had far-reaching political and military effects. From a broad perspective, the airlift may even have been an important as the Western allies' airlift that broke the Berlin blockade in 1948-49.

Militarily, the Israeli airlift was significant because it offset the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria, it overcame Israel's critical shortage in certain military items, and it strengthened Israel's overall military position.....

The Israelis called for American aid almost immediately after the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal. Their request was denied on 7 October because of a consensus within the Nixon administration that "they didn't really need the equipment" and that they didn't suffer from shortages material.6 Officials in the administration, most prominent among them Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, also believed in an inevitable Israeli victory with or without resupply.

Because of these numerous conditions, the United States deliberated for nearly a week on whether to authorize military aid to Israel. After costly battles; particularly in the Sinai, Israel on 8 October again requested assistance from the United States. This time it asked for aircraft, tank and artillery ammunition, and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment.12 Despite a deteriorating battlefield situation, the United States was still reluctant to commit to a resupply, preferring to analyze the extent of Soviet efforts and determine its effect on détente. At this point, the United States gave Israel tacit approval for El Al, the Israeli airline, to begin moving supplies to Israel. Consequently, planeloads of bombs and air-to-air missiles arrive in Israel on 10 October.

...

On 12 October 1973, before a final decision was made on the method of conducting the airlift, Mrs Meir personally sent President Nixon an urgent message requesting immediate assistance. At this point Israeli supplies were running critically low, and Israel's fate was in serious doubt. That day the president ordered DOD to immediately begin an airlift to Israel with cargoes destined for offload at Lajes Air Base.

....

The airlift to Israel lasted 32 days. Though not as large as the Berlin airlift, which carried more than 2 million tons of supplies to that city, the US airlift of 22,305 tons to Israel was impressive, nevertheless. The C-141s flew 421 missions to Israel, delivering 11,632 tons of equipment and supplies, while the C-5s flew 145 missions and delivered 10,673 tons of cargo. Some 48 percent of the total tonnage was moved on Galaxy flights, yet they flew only 25 percent of the missions.32 The Soviet airlift to Arab allies pales in comparison:

Best estimates of the Soviet effort were that their 935 missions, over a distance of 1,700 miles, moved in about 15,000 tons during a 40-day period. In short, MAC airlifted one-fourth more cargo with a little more than one-half the missions over a route that was three times greater.33

Overall, it appears that the American airlift had both substantive and psychological effects. The Israelis, who had begun to worry about how many shells they had left, were able to resume an extremely high rate of fire with the delivery of plentiful stocks of 105-, 155-, and 175-millimeter ammunition. With the influx of many of the consumables of war to replenish depleted stockpiles, they also were emboldened to throw all available reserves into the battle and succeeded in breaking through the Egyptian lines to the west side of the Suez Canal, threatening the bridgehead established by the Egyptians on the east side, and encircling the Egyptian Third Army.34 Psychologically, the Egyptians were shaken by this reversal of their military successes.

Another example of the impact of the airlift on the war was the effectiveness of the TOW and Maverick missiles. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, these weapons were responsible for the majority of Israeli tank kills (Arab losses were estimated at 1,900 tanks during the war). Since the TOW and Maverick were not present in the Israeli inventory in any significant numbers before the war began, it is apparent that the missiles delivered by airlift the difference.

.....

Facts and figures aside, American airlift "reversed the imbalance of military power created by the vast shipments of Russian war material to the Arab nations and led to a cease-fire which in turn brought about a return to the status quo. In short, the airlift possible the achievement of a national objective--peace in the Middle East."